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LIFE IN JAIL FOR MISBEHAVIOR: CRIMINAL CONTEMPT AND
THE CONSEQUENCE OF IMPROPER CLASSIFICATION
Kaley Ree Jaslow*
Abstract
Contempt is a crime that can be traced back to twelfth century
England. It was an offense of disobedience that caused the obstruction of
justice, and the punishment of such crimes was deeply important to the
English justice system. Subsequent to the American Revolution, early
American courts retained the use of contempt. Today, in the United
States, criminal contempt is a federal crime under 18 U.S.C. § 401.
Despite the federal code, actions that exemplify contempt are not
specifically defined by statute. Judges are granted broad discretion in
determining which actions are contemptuous and which are not.
Moreover, federal criminal contempt lacks an offense classification and
a statutory maximum. Judges are granted wide latitude in penalizing
contemnors.
In response to the lack of direction by statute, federal circuits have
formulated approaches to classify and punish contemnors; however, the
circuits are split as to the proper method of doing so. This split represents
a threat to equality, as equal crimes should be treated equally. The First
and Seventh Circuits classify criminal contempt as a Class A felony, for
which a plain reading of 18 U.S.C. § 401 creates no statutory maximum,
and thus a literal reading would allow for life imprisonment. The Ninth
Circuit analogizes the underlying action for the criminal contempt charge
to its most similar offense and sentences accordingly. Finally, the
Eleventh Circuit deems criminal contempt an offense sui generis, of its
own kind. These approaches are vastly different and can result in
sweeping variations in sentences. Such sweeping differences in criminal
sentencing runs contrary to the paramount concern of uniform
punishment. To uniformly punish contemnors, the circuits must identify
and punish contempt in a consistent manner. Congress should adopt a
statutory maximum for criminal contempt to ensure fundamental fairness
and uniformity.
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INTRODUCTION
A judge’s ability to impose sanctions for criminal contempt ensures
an orderly and effective judicial system. This judicial tool allows a judge
to assert authority over the workings of the judicial system and thereby
deter participating parties’ misbehavior. However, the power to hold an
individual in contempt of court is highly unregulated.1 Therefore, while

1. See Joan Meier, The “Right” to a Disinterested Prosecutor of Criminal Contempt:
Unpacking Public and Private Interests, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 85, 85 (1992).
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this license to hold an individual in contempt may act as a shield for the
court system, it often acts as a sword against the contemnor.2
A judge has broad discretion in imposing the conviction and sentence
upon an individual for criminal contempt.3 In fact, this authority, and its
latitude, dates back to the very creation of the American judicial system.4
In 1821, the United States Supreme Court stated, “Courts of justice are
universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power
to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and
submission to their lawful mandates . . . .”5 Given the lack of regulation
and the broad power granted to courts, contemnors and their crimes have
been classified in a variety of ways.6
This Note will examine the difficulty of classifying criminal contempt
and the consequences of failing to uniformly categorize the offense level
of criminal contempt. Part I will briefly describe the history of contempt.
Part II will define criminal contempt—both by distinguishing it from civil
contempt and by exploring the statute from which criminal contempt is
derived. In Part III, this Note will provide statistics from the Department
of Justice relating to contempt. In Part IV, this Note will explore various
circuits’ interpretations of criminal contempt. In Part V, this Note will
explain the significance of divergent interpretations of criminal
contempt’s classification. Part VI will examine the split in the circuits
over the proper interpretation of criminal contempt, while Part VII will
assess the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. Additionally, Part
VIII will compare these approaches to state approaches to contempt.
Finally, in Part IX, this Note will propose and analyze the proper

2. The contempt power allows the court to protect order and obedience, while contemnors
are subject to sweeping variations in punishment for a wide array of crimes. The power acts as a
sword against contemnors who are unable to predict the nature and extent of a criminal contempt
punishment.
3. United States v. Carpenter, 91 F.3d 1282, 1283 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Congress has not seen
fit to impose limitations on the sentencing power for contempts . . . .” (alteration in original)
(quoting Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 188 (1958))).
4. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1873) (“The moment the courts of the United
States were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they became
possessed of this power [i.e., the contempt power].”).
5. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 227 (1821).
6. See generally United States v. Wright, 812 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2016) (revealing the
differing ways in which courts have classified criminal contempt, and therefore sentenced
contemnors); United States v. Broussard, 611 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2010) (classifying the contempt
offense as a Class A felony); United States v. Cohn, 586 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that
contempt offenses cannot be classified); United States v. Ashqar, 582 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2009)
(upholding the application of a terrorism enhancement to a contempt offense and holding that
imposing a 135-month sentence was not unreasonable); Carpenter, 91 F.3d 1282 (classifying the
contempt offense as a Class A misdemeanor).
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approach to the classification of criminal contempt and recommend a
solution to achieve uniformity among the circuits.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
“Rules for preserving discipline, essential to the administration of
justice, came into existence with the law itself, and Contempt of Court
(contemptus curiae) has been a recognized phrase in English law from
the twelfth century.”7 Contempt developed as a method of protecting
against disobedience to the King, thereby protecting against the
obstruction of justice.8 Firmly established in English Common Law, the
use of contempt of court was also adopted by the newly independent
United States. “Viewed as a legal doctrine which was articulated and
immersed in the common law, it is generally a product of AngloAmerican society.”9 The United States began punishing contemnors as
early as 1788.10
In 1789, the First Congress granted courts of the United States the
“power to impose and administer all necessary oaths or affirmations, and
to punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all
contempt of authority in any cause or hearing before the same.”11 In
United States v. Hudson,12 the Court held that the contempt power cannot
be dispensed with because it is necessary for the proper administration of
justice.13 This power includes both civil and criminal contempt.14
Additionally, independent of statute, a court of the United States has the
power to fine and imprison individuals held in contempt.15 Congress
defined the power of the courts in 183116 and granted the Supreme Court
the ability to establish procedure for the punishment of contempt in
1941.17 Consequently, the Court enacted Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.18 Congress additionally codified contempt in 1948,19

7. JOHN C. FOX, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT: THE FORM OF TRIAL AND THE
MODE OF PUNISHMENT 1 (1972).
8. Id.
9. Ronald Goldfarb, The History of the Contempt Power, 1961 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 6 (1961).
10. Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. 319, 324 (1788).
11. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83 (1789).
12. 11 U.S. 32 (1812).
13. Id. at 34.
14. Civil and Criminal Contempt in the Federal Courts, 57 YALE L.J. 83, 90 n.49 (1947).
15. Id.
16. An Act Declaratory of the Law Concerning Contempt of Court, Act of Mar. 2, 1831,
ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487 (1831).
17. Act of June 29, 1940, ch. 492, 55 Stat. 779 (1941).
18. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42.
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1948).
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which remained law until 2002, when the statute was amended to its
current language.20
II. DEFINING CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
Criminal contempt is an offense distinguishable from civil contempt.
While the distinction may appear obscure at times,21 as a specific action
may be considered either a civil or criminal contempt22 and both criminal
and civil contempt can occur in either a civil or criminal trial,23 the
distinction is imperative to the imposition of punishment. Courts in
England and in many states drew this distinction24 before it was first
explored by the Supreme Court in 1911. 25 The Court focused on the
“character and purpose” of the sanction imposed to draw the distinction.26
Civil coercive contempt is prospective and intends “to be remedial by
coercing the defendant to do what he had refused to do.”27 However, and
noticeably more disciplinary, criminal contempt seeks to punish the
contemnor while vindicating the court.28 “Consequently, criminal
contempt is punitive in character.”29
A Federal Court has the power to hold an individual or an officer in
criminal contempt pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 401, which states:
A court of the United States shall have power to punish
by fine or imprisonment, or both, at its discretion, such
contempt of its authority, and none other, as—
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official
transactions;

20. See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2012).
21. Joel M. Androphy & Keith A. Byers, Federal Contempt of Court, 61 TEX. B.J. 16, 18
(1998).
22. Id. (citing In re Rumaker, 646 F.2d 870, 871 (5th Cir. 1980)).
23. Id. at 19 (citing United States v. Ryan, 810 F.2d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 1987); United States
v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); Hubbard v. Fleet Mortg. Co., 810 F.2d 778, 781–
82 (8th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); United States v. Rose, 806 F.2d 931, 933 (9th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam)).
24. Civil and Criminal Contempt in the Federal Courts, supra note 14.
25. See generally Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911) (examining
criminal and civil contempt).
26. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441.
27. Id. at 442. Civil contempt may also be compensatory, which compensates for loss rather
than coercing compliance.
28. Androphy & Byers, supra note 21 (citing Gompers, 221 U.S. at 422).
29. Id.
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(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process,
order, rule, decree, or command.30

Interestingly, the statute fails to specify a minimum or a maximum
sentence. Additionally, the statute does not classify contempt as a felony,
a misdemeanor, or a petty offense. Given the absence of a statutory
maximum and any classification of criminal contempt, the courts are
granted wide discretion in determining the appropriate penalty for such
an offense.31 Furthermore, Congress has not specifically limited this
discretion.32 Given the lack of clarity, courts have penalized contempt
offenses in vastly different manners.33
III. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
In March 2017, the Department of Justice released Federal Justice
Statistics from 2014 from the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the Federal
Justice Statistics Program. The data utilized was collected from the
United States Marshals Service, Drug Enforcement Administration,
Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts, U.S. Sentencing Commission, and the Federal Bureau of
Prisons.34 Interestingly, criminal contempt is classified by the
Department of Justice as an “[o]ther public order” offense, and is labeled
as “[p]erjury, contempt, and intimidation,”35 with obstruction of justice
grouped separately.
From October 1, 2013, to September 30, 2014, U.S. Attorneys
received 316 suspects for matters involving “[p]erjury, contempt, and
intimidation.”36 In that same year, 224 defendants were sentenced for
“[p]erjury, contempt, and intimidation,” with 162 defendants receiving a
term of incarceration, 46 receiving probation, and 3 receiving only a
30. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2012).
31. United States v. Carpenter, 91 F.3d 1282, 1283 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Congress has not seen
fit to impose limitations on the sentencing power for contempts . . . .” (alteration in original)
(quoting Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 188 (1958))).
32. Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149 (1969).
33. See generally United States v. Wright, 812 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2016) (imposing a sentence
of 30-months imprisonment); United States v. Broussard, 611 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2010) (imposing
a sentence of two years imprisonment and one year of supervised release); United States v. Cohn,
586 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 2009) (imposing a sentence of forty-five days imprisonment and five
years of supervised release); United States v. Ashqar, 582 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2009) (imposing a
135-month sentence); Carpenter, 91 F.3d 1282 (imposing a sentence of one year of supervised
release).
34. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2014 - STATISTICAL TABLES 1
(2017).
35. Id. at 9 tbl.2.1.
36. Id.
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fine.37 The average incarceration sentence length for all “[o]ther public
order offenses” was 73.1 months.38
IV. DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS FOR SENTENCING
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
Courts penalize criminal contempt differently because they interpret
18 U.S.C. § 401 differently.39 Under a strict interpretation of the statute,
the maximum penalty for criminal contempt is life imprisonment, which
would classify a violation as a Class A felony40—class A felonies are
those which are punishable by life imprisonment or death.41 This
interpretation implies that “Congress meant to brand all contempts as
serious and all contemnors as felons.”42 However, many courts have
refused to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 401 so strictly, recognizing that the wide
range of conduct that may constitute contempt requires a broader and
more lenient reading of the statute.43
A more lenient reading of the statute recognizes the appropriateness
of discretion granted to a trial judge to apply an open-ended range of
punishments such that the most egregious offenses are punished in a
suitable manner and minor offenses are punished properly as well.44 This
interpretation relies on the commentary within the sentencing guidelines,
U.S.S.G. § 2J1.1, which implies that the Sentencing Commission
neglected to promulgate a guideline sentence for criminal contempt
“[b]ecause misconduct constituting contempt varies significantly.”45 This
reading of the statute allows a sentencing judge to analogize a conviction
of criminal contempt to a crime of a similar nature and therefore to
penalize the offender with a sentence that reflects the seriousness of the
crime.46 The Ninth Circuit stated and later reaffirmed that “[t]he severity
of contempt violations for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) turns on the

37. Id. at 22 tbl.5.2.
38. Id. at 24 tbl.5.4.
39. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) (2012) (“An offense that is not specifically classified by a letter
grade in the section defining it, is classified if the maximum term of imprisonment authorized is—
(1) life imprisonment, or if the maximum penalty is death, as a Class A felony . . . .”); see United
States v. Ashqar, 582 F.3d 819, 825 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he statutory maximum for criminal
contempt is life . . . .”).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3559.
42. United States v. Carpenter, 91 F.3d 1282, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2J1.1 cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2018).
46. Carpenter, 91 F.3d at 1285.
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most analogous underlying offense.”47 This allows a court to determine
whether the contempt offense is best classified as a misdemeanor or a
felony.48
Yet other courts have concluded that criminal contempt is an offense
sui generis that is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor,49 as it lacks a
statutory maximum and therefore fails to fall neatly into a classification
category.50 An offense is classified sui generis—“[o]f its own kind”51—
when it would not be appropriate to deem an offense a felony or a
misdemeanor.52 Such interpretation suggests that classifying contempt as
sui generis allows a judge discretion to apply a punishment that fits the
crime, rather than attempting to classify every possible action that may
be classified as contempt as either a felony or a misdemeanor.53 This
interpretation may be practical.54
V. SO, WHY DOES THIS EVEN MATTER?
Any criminal contempt punishment implicates the constitutional due
process limit on deprivation of life, liberty, or property.55 Judicial
authority to punish individuals for criminal contempt may not defy the
limitations set forth by the Constitution,56 and sentences or fines that
exceed judicial authority may violate the Due Process Clause. The
Constitution further requires similar sentences for similar crimes.
Criminal contempt of court creates a specific obstacle for sentencing
specifically relating to the imposition of supervised release, and the
revocation of supervised release,57 and the lack of a statutory maximum
allows initial punishments to vary. In applying a term of supervised
release, the offense must fall into one of the types of felony or
misdemeanor class.58 Additionally, when applying a sentence upon
revocation of supervised release, the court looks to the seriousness of the
47. United States v. Broussard, 611 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2010).
48. Carpenter, 91 F.3d at 1285.
49. See United States v. Cohn, 586 F.3d 844, 849 (11th Cir. 2009).
50. Carpenter, 91 F.3d at 1284.
51. Sui generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
52. See Cohn, 586 F.3d at 848.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
56. See Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 383 (1919) (“[O]bstruction to the performance
of judicial duty resulting from an act done in the presence of the court is, then, the characteristic
upon which the power to punish for contempt must rest.”).
57. United States v. Wright, 812 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 2016); United States v. Broussard,
611 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010); Cohn, 586 F.3d at 848; United States v. Carpenter, 91 F.3d
1282, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996).
58. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
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underlying offense.59 This requires the court to classify the underlying
offense to determine the appropriate sentence.60 Offenses are classified
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a), which states:
An offense that is not specifically classified by a letter
grade in the section defining it, is classified if the maximum
term of imprisonment authorized is—
(1) life imprisonment, or if the maximum penalty is death,
as a Class A felony;
(2) twenty-five years or more, as a Class B felony;
(3) less than twenty-five years but ten or more years, as a
Class C felony;
(4) less than ten years but five or more years, as a Class D
felony;
(5) less than five years but more than one year, as a Class
E felony;
(6) one year or less but more than six months, as a Class A
misdemeanor;
(7) six months or less but more than thirty days, as a Class
B misdemeanor;
(8) thirty days or less but more than five days, as a Class C
misdemeanor; or
(9) five days or less, or if no imprisonment is authorized,
as an infraction.61

Therefore, depending on the interpretation of the statute, the sentence
imposed for criminal contempt, or upon revocation of supervised release
with the underlying offense of criminal contempt, may vary vastly.
VI. A SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS
The differing interpretations of the penalty for criminal contempt,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 401, become readily apparent upon an
examination of holdings among the United States Circuit Courts.62 The
Seventh Circuit and the First Circuit, in 2009 and 2016, respectively, read
the statute strictly and interpreted criminal contempt as a Class A felony
with life imprisonment as the maximum term imprisonment authorized.63
The Ninth Circuit read the statute liberally in both 1996 and 2010,
59. Broussard, 611 F.3d at 1071.
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b) (2012).
61. Id. § 3559(a).
62. See Wright, 812 F.3d at 32; Broussard, 611 F.3d at 1072; Cohn, 586 F.3d at 849; United
States v. Ashqar, 582 F.3d 819, 825 (7th Cir. 2009); Carpenter, 91 F.3d at 1285.
63. See Wright, 812 F.3d at 32; Ashqar, 582 F.3d at 825.
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analogizing the offense to one similar in character.64 Conversely, the
Eleventh Circuit, in 2009, interpreted the statute as a sui generis offense,
classifying contempt as neither a felony nor a misdemeanor.65
A. History of the Circuit Split
Four circuits use three different approaches to criminal contempt. This
results in a lack of uniformity that presents a serious concern for
contemnors. None of the circuits appear to be willing to budge from their
reading of the statutory language in 18 U.S.C. § 401. In fact, the circuits
expressly comment on the pitfalls and perils of using an approach
different than their own.66
The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of classification for criminal
contempt as a question of first impression in United States v. Carpenter67
in 1996 and determined that “criminal contempt should be classified for
sentencing purposes according to the applicable Guidelines range for the
most nearly analogous offense.”68 In 2009, the Eleventh Circuit declared
criminal contempt to be a sui generis offense, directly declining to follow
Ninth Circuit persuasive precedent, reasoning that sentencing
considering the most analogous offense fails to consider criminal
contempt in the absence of a sufficiently analogous offense.69 Days later,
in United States v. Ashqar,70 the Seventh Circuit merely stated, without
explanation, that “the statutory maximum for criminal contempt is
life . . . .”71 The next year, in 2010, the Ninth Circuit again addressed the
issue of classification in United States v. Broussard.72 In Broussard, the
Ninth Circuit held firm on its reasoning in Carpenter but revised the
holding by requiring consideration of the statutory maximum of an

64. See Broussard, 611 F.3d at 1072; Carpenter, 91 F.3d at 1285.
65. See Cohn, 586 F.3d at 849.
66. See Wright, 812 F.3d at 32–34; Cohn, 586 F.3d at 847 n.7; Carpenter, 91 F.3d at 1284.
67. 91 F.3d 1282 (9th Cir. 1996).
68. Id. at 1285.
69. Cohn, 586 F.3d at 847 n.7 (“The Ninth Circuit is the only court of appeals to have ruled
on this precise issue in a reported decision. . . . We decline to adopt this method of classification.
The method does not address how to classify criminal contempt if a sufficiently analogous
guideline is absent. More importantly, maximum penalties are established by statute, not the
Sentencing Guidelines. It is far from clear whether a district court, in classifying a criminal
contempt, should use the maximum penalty called for by the base offense level or the total offense
level, including all possible enhancements.”).
70. 582 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2009) (affirming Ashqar’s 135 month sentence for criminal
contempt and obstruction of justice).
71. Id. at 825.
72. 611 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2010).
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analogous offense, rather than merely looking to the sentencing
guidelines.73
Most recently, in 2016, the First Circuit addressed this question for
the first time in United States v. Wright.74 In Wright, the court joined “the
Seventh Circuit in holding that the statutory maximum for the offense of
criminal contempt, 18 U.S.C. § 401, is life imprisonment.”75 However,
given the brevity of the discussion of classification in Ashqar,76 the First
Circuit extended the Seventh Circuit holding to include that criminal
contempt should be classified as a Class A felony for the purposes of 18
U.S.C. § 3559(a).77 The court explicitly addressed the concerns of the
Ninth Circuit and chose to disregard them as not crucial enough to
warrant overlooking the plain language of § 401.78 The First Circuit did
not read the plain language as “patently absurd,”79 as statutory language
is within the domain of “Congress, and not the courts, to create sentencing
policy.”80 The Wright court explicitly rejected the Eleventh Circuit
holding—that criminal contempt is an offense sui generis—as well.81 In
its rejection of the Eleventh Circuit holding, the court offered reasoning
similar to that which it applied in its rejection of the Ninth Circuit
holding. The First Circuit held firmly to its plain language interpretation
of the statute, noting that the Eleventh Circuit has not refuted this
reading.82 Therefore, the court explained, even though the Supreme Court
has referred to criminal contempt as a sui generis offense, this does not
negate the possibility that Congress intended the offense to be punishable
by life imprisonment, requiring it to be classified as a Class A felony for
the purposes of § 3559(a).83 The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this
split among the circuits.
B. The First and Seventh Circuit Interpretation
In United States v. Ashqar, the Seventh Circuit held that the statutory
maximum for criminal contempt is life imprisonment.84 The court spent
73. Id. at 1073 (“The sentencing guidelines are now advisory. The maximum sentence
authorized by the statute of conviction is the upper limit on a district judge’s discretion. We adapt
Carpenter’s express rationale to this new reality.”).
74. 812 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 2016).
75. Id. at 32 (citation omitted) (citing Ashqar, 582 F.3d at 825).
76. Ashqar, 582 F.3d at 825.
77. Wright, 812 F.3d at 32.
78. Id. at 33.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 34.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. United States v. Ashqar, 582 F.3d 819, 825 (7th Cir. 2009).
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little time discussing this issue and instead asserted the statutory
maximum as fact before discussing the legality of the terrorism
enhancement which it imposed on the sentence for contempt and
obstruction of justice.85 However, subsequent to this holding, the First
Circuit, in United States v. Wright, similarly asserted that the maximum
penalty for criminal contempt is life imprisonment, therefore holding that
contempt is a Class A felony for purposes of revocation of supervised
release.86
In United States v. Wright, the court sentenced the defendant to thirty
months’ imprisonment for violating his supervised release.87 The district
court determined the underlying offense of criminal contempt to be a
Class A felony, and, upon appeal, the First Circuit then addressed the
question of how to classify criminal contempt as an issue of first
impression.88 The court agreed with the district court and held that
criminal contempt is a Class A felony punishable by life imprisonment.89
In doing so, the court reasoned that it is bound by the plain reading of the
statute and joined the Seventh Circuit in its holding that criminal
contempt is a crime without a statutory maximum and is therefore
punishable by life imprisonment.90
Moreover, the court explained that an abundance of case law grants
judges wide discretion in sentencing for crimes without statutory
maximums, “including up to life imprisonment.”91 The court relied on
United States v. Turner,92 which explains, “the sensible rule of statutory
construction [is that] the absence of a specified maximum simply means
that the maximum is life imprisonment. By declining to limit the penalty,
Congress gives maximum discretion to the sentencing court.”93
Additionally, the court reasoned that the only occasion to ignore a plain
reading of the statute is in the event of an “undeniable textual ambiguity,
or some other extraordinary consideration, such as the prospect of
yielding a patently absurd result.”94 The court rejected the Ninth Circuit
approach in this line of reasoning, stating that the concern of “absurdity”
85. Id.
86. Wright, 812 F.3d at 30 (“Wright’s underlying criminal contempt conviction was a Class
A felony under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a), which carries a maximum revocation imprisonment sentence
of five years, according to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).”).
87. Id. at 31.
88. Id. at 32.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing United States v. Ortiz-Garcia, 665 F.3d 279, 285 (1st Cir. 2011)).
92. 389 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2004).
93. Id. at 120.
94. Wright, 812 F.3d at 33 (quoting United States v. Fernandez, 722 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.
2013)).
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does not warrant ignoring the strict interpretation and plain meaning of
the statute.95 Finally, the court determined that it is not within the realm
of the judiciary to discern the proper sentencing for an offense, as it is the
legislatures’ duty to write and give meaning to an offense.96 However,
the First Circuit reasoned that the discretion to sentence individuals for
criminal contempt is not unchecked, since sentencing guidelines consider
many factors pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e).97
C. The Ninth Circuit Interpretation
In Carpenter, the Ninth Circuit rejected a strict reading of 18 U.S.C.
§ 401 and elected to analogize the nature of the criminal contempt charge
to its most similar offense.98 Under this approach, a sentencing judge has
the discretion to penalize a defendant by using the sentencing guidelines
of the analogous crime to impose a sentence.99 A court will then use the
sentencing guidelines of the analogous crime to impose a sentence.100 The
Ninth Circuit interpreted the penalty for criminal contempt entirely
differently than the First and Seventh Circuits. The Carpenter court
reasoned, “[t]he Sentencing Guidelines do not contain a specific
guideline for criminal contempt. However, U.S.S.G. § 2J1.1 says to apply
U.S.S.G. § 2X5.1, which in turn directs the court to apply the most
analogous offense guideline.”101 Where a strict interpretation of 18
U.S.C. § 401 would suggest that the maximum penalty is life
imprisonment, this court reasoned that this could not possibly be
Congress’ intent.102 Many actions meet the criteria for “contempt,” and
yet not all actions are so severe as to require a felony classification.103 “It
would be unreasonable to conclude that by authorizing an open-ended
range of punishments to enable courts to address even the most egregious
contempts appropriately, Congress meant to brand all contempts as
serious and all contemnors as felons.”104 The court then suggested that
the scope and variety of conduct which may constitute contempt could
not possibly be read to hold that all 18 U.S.C. § 401 offenses are
felonies.105 Therefore, the court decided against immediately classifying
95. Id.
96. Id. at 34.
97. Id.
98. United States v. Carpenter, 91 F.3d 1282, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1283.
102. Id. at 1284.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (“[F]ailure to establish maximum sentence for contempt may reflect Congress’s
‘recognition of the scope of criminal contempt[.]’ . . . Sentencing Commission decided against
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all criminal contempts as Class A felonies,106 reasoning that the only
similarity between criminal contempt and other Class A felonies is the
lack of a statutory maximum.107 Crimes of the most serious nature are
classified as Class A felonies, and the court found it “absurd” to suggest
criminal contempt necessarily belongs in this category.108 The First and
Seventh Circuits plainly declined to interpret the statute this way.109
Unlike the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation, the Ninth Circuit further
held that the inability to classify all contempts as Class A felonies does
not require that criminal contempt pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 401 is an
offense sui generis.110 The court found that the line of reasoning upon
which the defendant in Carpenter relied is futile.111 The defendant argued
that in United States v. Holmes112 the Fifth Circuit held that a
misdemeanor or felony fine could not be applied to criminal contempt as
criminal contempt was neither a misdemeanor nor a felony.113 The Ninth
Circuit rejected this holding, stating that many other courts have
classified criminal contempt.114
Additionally, in a more recent decision, the Ninth Circuit held firm on
its reasoning in Carpenter, explaining that “[t]he severity of contempt
violations for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) turns on the most
analogous underlying offense.”115 However, the court adapted Carpenter,
as federal sentencing guidelines are no longer mandatory, but rather
advisory after Broussard.116 In Broussard, the court held that the
discretion of a sentencing judge to impose a penalty is no longer limited
by the sentencing guidelines, but rather by the statutory maximum of the
offense.117

promulgating a criminal contempt guideline ‘[b]ecause misconduct constituting contempt varies
significantly.’” (fourth alteration in original) (citation omitted) (first quoting Frank v. United
States, 395 U.S. 147, 149 (1969); and then quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2J1.1
cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1995))).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See United States v. Wright, 812 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 2016); United States v. Ashqar,
582 F.3d 819, 825 (7th Cir. 2009).
110. Carpenter, 91 F.3d at 1284.
111. Id.
112. 833 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1987).
113. Carpenter, 91 F.3d at 1284 (citing Holmes, 833 F.2d 481).
114. Id.
115. United States v. Broussard, 611 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2010).
116. Id.
117. Id.
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D. The Eleventh Circuit Interpretation
The Eleventh Circuit approach to classification rejects all such
uniform classification attempts.118 It is the opinion of the court that
criminal contempt is much too far reaching to be appropriately classified
in all its possible violations.119 Moreover, it would be impractical to
individually classify every possible violation.120 Therefore, the Eleventh
Circuit elects to interpret criminal contempt as a sui generis offense rather
than as a felony or a misdemeanor.121
The Eleventh Circuit came to this conclusion in United States v. Cohn,
where Defendant Cohn appealed his sentence for criminal contempt as a
Class A felony.122 Cohn received 45 days’ imprisonment and five years
of supervised release.123 The court considered whether criminal contempt
was properly classified as a Class A felony as a question of first
impression.124
The court conceded that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a), an offense
lacking a letter grade classification is instead classified by the maximum
term of imprisonment authorized for the offense.125 The Eleventh Circuit
explained that the district court classified criminal contempt as a Class A
felony because 18 U.S.C. § 401 does not contain a maximum penalty; a
violation is punishable by life imprisonment.126 Moreover, Class A
felonies are ineligible for a sentence of mere probation.127 However, the
Eleventh Circuit plainly disagreed with the district court’s interpretation
of § 3559(a)’s classification scheme.128
The court noted that the Supreme Court has recognized a broad range
of offenses which constitute criminal contempt,129 as well as a variety of
appropriate sentences,130 and reasoned that “[n]o single sentencing

118. United States v. Cohn, 586 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 2009).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 845.
122. Id. at 846.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 847.
125. Id. at 847–48.
126. Id. at 848.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149 (1969) (“[A] person may be found in
contempt of court for a great many different types of offenses . . . . Congress, perhaps in
recognition of the scope of criminal contempt, has authorized courts to impose penalties but has
not placed any specific limits on their discretion . . . .”).
130. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 188 (1958) (“Congress has not seen fit to impose
limitations on the sentencing power for contempts . . . .”).
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guideline applies to § 401.”131 The court explained that courts defer to the
“Other Felony Offenses” section of the Guidelines132 instead of using a
specific guideline. The court further acknowledged the note in U.S.S.G.
§ 2J1.1 Contempt, which explains that the Commission has elected not to
provide a guideline sentence for criminal contempt given the wide variety
of conduct which may constitute contempt.133 The court then reasoned
that a uniform classification of criminal contempt as either a felony or a
misdemeanor would be inconsistent with the variety of conduct that
constitutes criminal contempt. Alternatively, a specific classification for
every action that constitutes criminal contempt would be arduous and
perhaps never exhaustive.134 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that criminal contempt is “best categorized as a sui generis offense, rather
than a felony or misdemeanor.”135
An offense sui generis is a unique or peculiar crime of its own class.136
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that this is consistent with the meaning of
§ 401, “reflect[ing] the differences between criminal contempt and the
traditional crimes classified pursuant to § 3559.”137 The court further
explained that previous Supreme Court decisions have similarly
classified criminal contempt as offenses sui generis.138 Therefore, the
Eleventh Circuit declined to classify criminal contempt pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 3559.

131. Cohn, 586 F.3d at 848.
132. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2X5.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
133. Id. § 2J1.1 cmt. n.1 (“Because misconduct constituting contempt varies significantly
and the nature of the contemptuous conduct, the circumstances under which the contempt was
committed, the effect the misconduct had on the administration of justice, and the need to
vindicate the authority of the court are highly context-dependent, the Commission has not
provided a specific guideline for this offense.”).
134. Cohn, 586 F.3d at 848.
135. Id.
136. Sui generis, supra note 51.
137. Cohn, 586 F.3d at 849.
138. See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966) (referring to criminal contempt
as “an offense sui generis”); see also United States v. Holmes, 822 F.2d 481, 493 (5th Cir. 1987)
(“[T]he Supreme Court has never characterized contempt as either a felony or a misdemeanor, but
rather has described it as ‘an offense sui generis.’” (quoting Cheff, 384 U.S. at 380)).
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VII. ASSESSING THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESS OF THE
DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS
The three approaches to classifying criminal contempt—the “Class A
felony” interpretation,139 the “analogous offense” interpretation,140 and
the sui generis offense interpretation141—all exhibit particular strengths.
However, no approach is without its pitfalls.
A. Class A Felony
Categorizing all criminal contempts as Class A felonies provides
uniformity and judicial efficiency, a hallmark of American jurisprudence
and the very purpose behind the creation of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines.142 In fact, the primary purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines
include:
(1) to create a fair sentencing system that provided
offenders certainty and honesty in sentencing; (2) to narrow
the disparity in sentencing among similar offenders
convicted of similar crimes; and (3) to establish a sentencing
system that calculated a defendant’s sentence in proportion
to the severity of the individual's criminal conduct.143
Using this approach—categorizing all acts of criminal contempt as
Class A felonies—promotes this function. All Class A felonies are
subject to the same sentencing range pursuant to U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3559,
and 3583.

139. This is the First and Seventh Circuit approach. See generally United States v. Wright,
812 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2016) (classifying criminal contempt as a Class A felony); United States v.
Ashqar, 582 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2009) (classifying criminal contempt as a Class A felony).
140. This is the Ninth Circuit approach. See generally United States v. Broussard, 611 F.3d
1069 (9th Cir. 2010) (classifying criminal contempt as an analogous offense); United States v.
Carpenter, 91 F.3d 1282 (9th Cir. 1996) (classifying criminal contempt as an analogous offense).
141. This is the Eleventh Circuit approach. See generally Cohn, 586 F.3d 844 (classifying
criminal contempt as a sui generis offense).
142. Rebekah R. Runyon, Am I Under Arrest? Why the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Need a
Strict Definition of What Constitutes an Intervening Arrest, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1307, 1307 (2015)
(“Congress provided for the creation of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines to promote fairness and
produce proportional and uniform sentences.”).
143. Id. at 1310 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2014); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION 1–2, https://isb.ussc.gov/files/USSC_Overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/NC89EVSK].
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However, criminal contempt covers a broad array of actions ranging
from being excessively loud144 to refusal to testify.145 Pigeonholing such
vastly different actions into a single classification runs contrary to the
notions of justice and fairness. Therefore, while this approach forwards
the idea of uniformity, it fails to consider the differences in crimes that
constitute criminal contempt. Moreover, to suggest that Congress
intended for criminal contempt to be punishable by life imprisonment
completely discounts the nature of the offense. Excessive noise, as to
disturb the judicial proceedings, cannot be synonymous with first degree
murder—a crime also punishable by life imprisonment. As noted by the
Carpenter court, “[i]t would be unreasonable to conclude that by
authorizing an open-ended range of punishments to enable courts to
address even the most egregious contempts appropriately, Congress
meant to brand all contempts as serious and all contemnors as felons.”146
B. Analogous Offense
Given the dynamic character of criminal contempt, avoiding rigid
classification of the offense may more gracefully satisfy society’s notions
of justice. Analogizing the actions that constitute the violation of criminal
contempt presents a more fluid and malleable approach to classifying
criminal contempt. Under this approach, violations are classified
according to the classification of the most similar crime. Rather than
outright deciding that all offenses will be felonies, or misdemeanors, this
scheme of classification considers the totality of the circumstances from
which the offense arises. “The idea is simple: similar cases should be
treated similarly.”147 However, this scheme presents three possible
shortcomings: inconsistent analogizing, situations that lack appropriate
analogies, and unfettered discretion of the court to determine the
appropriate analogy. The Eleventh Circuit explains, “[t]he method does
not address how to classify criminal contempt if a sufficiently analogous

144. See Cuyler v. Atlantic & N.C.R. Co., 131 F. 95, 98 (C.C.E.D.N.C. 1904) (“Any loud
noise or other disturbance in the presence of the court, or in the street or other place so near thereto
as to interfere with the orderly proceedings of the court, would undoubtedly tend to obstruct the
administration of justice, and under such circumstances the court is empowered to summarily
punish for contempt.”).
145. See Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 383 (1919) (“[O]bstruction to the performance
of judicial duty resulting from an act done in the presence of the court is, then, the characteristic
upon which the power to punish for contempt must rest.”).
146. United States v. Carpenter, 91 F.3d 1282, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996).
147. Rachael A. Hill, Character, Choice, and “Aberrant Behavior”: Aligning Criminal
Sentencing with Concepts of Moral Blame, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 975, 975 (1998). Hill goes on to
explain, “Thus, situations inevitably arise where the Guidelines call for a sentence substantially
more severe than our moral intuitions tell us is necessary or right.” Id.
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guideline is absent.”148 The avoidance of uniform classification presents
an immediate concern of inconsistency, the problem already at hand,
which the solution of analogizing exacerbates. Moreover, it allows a
judge to make a unilateral decision as to what is the most analogous
offense and sentence a contemnor for a crime he has not necessarily
committed.149
C. Sui Generis Offense
Classification of criminal contempt as an offense sui generis allows
flexibility not available under alternative approaches. It completely
bypasses the need to categorize an offense, but rather accords a sentence
solely based on the crime committed. Like the analogous offense
approach, it looks to the totality of circumstances. However, also
comparable to the analogous offense approach, it lacks any semblance of
uniformity. To classify criminal contempt as an offense sui generis tells
the court absolutely nothing about how the crime should be sentenced,
leaving the court’s discretion unfettered.
The Eleventh Circuit, in holding that criminal contempt is an offense
sui generis, relied on a reference made by the Supreme Court.150 In Cheff
v. Schnackenberg,151 the Supreme Court alluded to criminal contempt as
an offense sui generis but did not require it in its holding.152 The Supreme
Court has not explicitly held that criminal contempt is an offense sui
generis,153 and circuits are therefore not bound by the reference in Cheff.
Moreover, as the First Circuit noted, the Supreme Court’s reference to
criminal contempt as an offense sui generis does not negate Congress’s
intent, which very well may have been that criminal contempt is a Class
A felony with a maximum term of life imprisonment.154

148. United States v. Cohn, 586 F.3d 844, 847 n.7 (11th Cir. 2009).
149. In Carpenter, the defendant’s criminal contempt was classified pursuant to the
classification for obstruction of justice. Carpenter, 91 F.3d at 1285. The defendant had not been
charged, nor convicted of obstruction of justice. See id. at 1285.
150. Cohn, 586 F.3d at 849 (citing Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966)
(referring to criminal contempt as “an offense sui generis”); United States v. Holmes, 822 F.2d
481, 493 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he Supreme Court has never characterized contempt as either a
felony or a misdemeanor, but rather has described it as ‘an offense sui generis.’” (quoting Cheff,
384 U.S. at 380))).
151. 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
152. Id. at 380.
153. Cheff, 384 U.S. at 380.
154. United States v. Wright, 812 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 2016).
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VIII. HOW DOES THIS COMPARE TO STATE TREATMENT
OF CONTEMPT?
To reconcile the differing treatments of federal criminal contempt, it
is important to understand the treatment of criminal contempt at the state
level. This Note uses Texas, Florida, New York, and California as
samples.155 The populations of these four states represent about one third
of the entire United States population and are therefore fairly
representative of how citizens are treated at the state level in the United
States. Each state defines criminal contempt and provides an offense
classification, a maximum sentence, or both purposes of sentencing.
Florida defines contempt as “[a] refusal to obey any legal order,
mandate or decree, made or given by any judge relative to any of the
business of the court”156 for which every court may impose
punishment.157 Florida does not classify contempt as a felony or a
misdemeanor but rather as a common law offense.158 However, Florida
does define the punishment for common law crimes, and consequently
defines the punishment for contempt: “when there exists no such
provision by statute, the court shall proceed to punish such offense by
fine or imprisonment, but the fine shall not exceed $500, nor the
imprisonment 12 months.”159 Additionally, for the purposes of right to
counsel, contempt is the “functional equivalent” of a misdemeanor.160
Thus, in Florida, a criminal contemnor is granted the right to counsel, as
the punishment for such an offense includes incarceration.161
California, however, patently defines contempt as a misdemeanor.162
In California, a misdemeanor is punishable by “imprisonment in the
county jail not exceeding six months, or by fine not exceeding one
thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both.”163 Moreover, the contempt statute
in California explicitly defines the occasions on which punishment

155. The four states represent about one third of the entire United States population and are
therefore fairly representative of how citizens are treated at the state level in the United States.
156. FLA. STAT. § 38.23 (2018).
157. Id. § 38.22.
158. Graves v. State, 821 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (“Contempt is a common
law crime in Florida, which, although recognized by statute, is not specifically classified by statute
as either a felony or a misdemeanor.” (citation omitted)).
159. FLA. STAT. § 775.02 (2018).
160. Giordano v. State, 32 So. 3d 96, 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
161. Moorman v. Bentley, 490 So. 2d 186, 187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
162. CAL. PENAL CODE § 166(a) (West 2018).
163. Id. § 19.
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should exceed the standard punishment for a misdemeanor,164 as allowed
by statute.165
In Texas, the punishment for contempt of court is explicitly defined
by statute. Contempt of court, other than in a municipal court or justice
court, is punishable by a fine of $500, six months’ imprisonment, or
both.166 Texas classifies offenses not specifically labeled as a felonies of
the third degree if imprisonment in a penitentiary is possible, as Class B
misdemeanors if the offense is not a felony and jail is affixed as a possible
punishment, and as Class C misdemeanors if the offense is punishable by
a fine only.167 Texas classifies offenses as either felonies or
misdemeanors.168
Finally, New York designates criminal contempt as either second
degree, first degree, or aggravated criminal contempt.169 Second degree
criminal contempt is a Class A misdemeanor.170 First degree criminal
contempt is a Class E felony.171 Aggravated criminal contempt is a Class
D felony.172 A Class A misdemeanor is punishable by up to one year
imprisonment and/or a fine of not more than $1,000.173 A Class E felony
is punishable by up to four years’ imprisonment and/or a fine of not more
than $5,000.174 A Class D felony is punishable by up to seven years
imprisonment and/or a fine of not more than $5,000.175
This selection of states illustrates the use of clear and distinct
punishments for criminal contempt. Federal courts lack such exact
guidelines for sentencing criminal contempt. For that reason, circuits
have developed various methods for sentencing contempt. However,
these methods lack the precision that sentencing in Florida, California,
Texas, and New York exemplify.

164. Id. § 166(b)–(d).
165. Id. § 19 (“Except in cases where a different punishment is prescribed by any law of this
state, every offense declared to be a misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment in the county
jail not exceeding six months, or by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by
both.”).
166. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 21.002 (West 2018).
167. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.41 (West 2018).
168. Id. § 12.02.
169. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 215.50–52 (McKinney 2018).
170. Id. § 215.50.
171. Id. § 215.51.
172. Id. § 215.52.
173. Id. §§ 70.15, 80.05.
174. Id. §§ 70.00, 80.00(a).
175. Id. §§ 70.00, 80.00(a).
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IX. SO, NOW WHAT?
Generally speaking, none of the interpretations for classifying
criminal contempt pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 401 are incorrect. As explained
by the First and Seventh Circuits, there is no statutory maximum for the
offense, and “the sensible rule of statutory construction [is that] the
absence of a specified maximum simply means that the maximum is life
imprisonment.”176 Under the plain meaning of the statute, the maximum
is technically life imprisonment, making contempt a Class A felony.177
“An offense that is not specifically classified by a letter grade in the
section defining it, is classified if the maximum term of imprisonment
authorized is . . . life imprisonment, or if the maximum penalty is death,
as a Class A felony.”178 Yet the Ninth Circuit also correctly analogizes
criminal contempt to the offense it is most similar to, presenting a
practical approach to classifying criminal contempt.179 Additionally, as
reasoned by the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court did reference
criminal contempt as an offense sui generis.180 However, these different
methods for categorizing criminal contempt produce different outcomes.
Invariably, criminal contempt is a Class A felony in the First and Seventh
Circuits.181 In the Ninth Circuit, criminal contempt may be a Class A
felony but it may also be a misdemeanor, depending on the most
analogous offense.182 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit classifies the offense
as neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, but rather as an offense sui
generis.183 Therefore, because categorizing criminal contempt as a Class
A felony, by analogizing it to its most similar offense, and categorizing
criminal contempt as an offense sui generis are all theoretically sound
methods, and yet all result in different outcomes for a defendant, a
definitive system for classification must be reached. Our justice system
176. United States v. Turner, 389 F.3d 111, 120 (4th Cir. 2004).
177. United States v. Wright, 812 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 2016).
178. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) (2012).
179. See generally United States v. Carpenter, 91 F.3d 1282, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e
conclude that criminal contempt should be classified for sentencing purposes according to the
applicable Guidelines range for the most nearly analogous offense.”).
180. See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966) (referring to criminal contempt
as “an offense sui generis”); see also United States v. Holmes, 822 F.2d 481, 493 (5th Cir. 1987)
(“[T]he Supreme Court has never characterized contempt as either a felony or a misdemeanor, but
rather has described it as ‘an offense sui generis.’” (quoting Cheff, 384 U.S. at 380)).
181. See generally Wright, 812 F.3d 27 (classifying criminal contempt as a Class A felony);
United States v. Ashqar, 582 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2009) (classifying criminal contempt as a Class
A felony).
182. See generally Carpenter, 91 F.3d 1282 (classifying criminal contempt as an analogous
offence).
183. See generally United States v. Cohn, 586 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 2009) (classifying criminal
contempt as a sui generis offense).
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must therefore come to a conclusive determination for the proper method
of classifying criminal contempt because convictions for the same
offense must be uniform to properly effectuate justice.
Legislative intent is instructive in approaching this predicament.
Relying on Sentencing Commission commentary, as the Carpenter court
stated, “[i]t would be unreasonable to conclude that by authorizing an
open-ended range of punishments to enable courts to address even the
most egregious contempts appropriately, Congress meant to brand all
contempts as serious and all contemnors as felons.”184 Crimes of the most
serious nature are classified as Class A felonies. This includes capital
offenses, rape, murder, and other similarly violent crimes. Criminal
contempt cannot be classified with such heinous and “extraordinarily
serious crimes.”185 In fact, the Ninth Circuit notes that the only similarity
between Class A felonies and criminal contempt is the lack of a statutory
maximum.186 It is readily apparent from the face of the statute , due to the
stark contrast between Class A felonies and criminal contempt, that
Congress did not include a statutory maximum because Congress did not
want to limit the vast discretion of the court in sentencing for the variety
of conduct that constitutes criminal contempt.187
Common sense dictates that criminal contempt not be classified as a
Class A felony. For example, criminal contempt is often analogous to
obstruction of justice.188 Obstruction of justice is not a Class A Felony.189
This is illustrated by Carpenter, in which the defendant refused to testify
upon being subpoenaed to a grand jury hearing.190 Upon release from jail
for civil contempt, the defendant was arrested and charged with criminal
contempt.191 The district court sentenced the defendant pursuant to the
presentencing report and analogized the offense to obstruction of justice
as suggested by U.S.S.G. § 2J1.1.192 Obstruction of justice was classified
as a Class A misdemeanor for sentencing purposes.193 The Ninth Circuit
concluded “that criminal contempt should be classified for sentencing
purposes according to the applicable Guidelines range for the most nearly
184. Carpenter, 91 F.3d at 1284.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1283 (“Congress has not seen fit to impose limitations on the sentencing power
for contempts . . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 188
(1958))).
188. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2J1.1 cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2018).
189. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) (2012).
190. Carpenter, 91 F.3d at 1282.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1283.
193. Id. at 1285.
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analogous offense.”194 Therefore, by analogizing the crime to its most
similar offense, a court is able to properly punish for criminal contempt
based on its severity,195 rather than according to a blanket classification
as a Class A felony, which may not accurately represent the crime
committed. Moreover, if the crime is easily classified by the
circumstances surrounding the offense, there is no need to classify it as
sui generis—neither a felony nor a misdemeanor—especially since the
Supreme Court never explicitly held that criminal contempt is a crime sui
generis and referenced that classification only in dicta.196
In terms of practicality, the Ninth Circuit approach presents the most
reasonable of the three methods of classification. It is the only means of
classification that thoroughly examines the crime of contempt in making
a determination of its appropriate classification. Classifying criminal
contempt as a Class A felony or as sui generis ignores the context in
which the offense occurs. Neither approach considers the real world
consequences of failing to consider the factual specificities of the offense.
Neither approach considers the specific facts of the crime. What is the
practicality in defining an act of criminal contempt, one so similar to
obstruction of justice, as a Class A felony, or an offense sui generis? If
the actions that constitute criminal contempt do not differ from the
actions that constitute obstruction of justice, where is the justice in
classifying one as a Class A felony or as an offense sui generis but not
the other?
Additionally, neither the Class A felony approach nor the sui generis
approach offer much support for their reasoning.197 Aside from the plain
meaning of the statute,198 it seems extreme to suggest that criminal
contempt is an offense punishable by up to life imprisonment. Moreover,
the Supreme Court never held that criminal contempt is an offense sui
generis.199 These proffered reasonings are not sufficient for the purposes
of creating a uniform method of classification.

194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966).
197. See generally United States v. Wright, 812 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2016) (classifying criminal
contempt as a Class A felony); United States v. Cohn, 586 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 2009) (classifying
criminal contempt as a sui generis offense); United States v. Ashqar, 582 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2009)
(classifying criminal contempt as a Class A felony).
198. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) (2012) (“An offense that is not specifically classified by a letter
grade in the section defining it, is classified if the maximum term of imprisonment authorized
is . . . life imprisonment, or if the maximum penalty is death, as a Class A felony.”); see Ashqar,
582 F.3d at 825 (“[T]he statutory maximum for criminal contempt is life . . . .”).
199. See Cheff, 384 U.S. at 380.
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Conversely, the Analogous Offense approach considers the policy
behind the statutory text by embracing the broad discretion of the court200
and recognizes that the various conduct that constitutes criminal
contempt deserves case-by-case analysis.201 The statutory maximum is
absent from the text of 18 U.S.C. 401 because of Congress’s intent to give
broad discretion to the court; the absence of a stated statutory maximum
does not signal the appropriateness of a maximum authorized punishment
of life imprisonment.202 The Commentary to the United States Sentencing
Guidelines obviates this fact.203 In fact, U.S.S.G. § 2J1.1 Contempt
specifically promotes analogizing to a similar offense, most notably, as
seen in Carpenter,204 to obstruction of justice:
Because misconduct constituting contempt varies
significantly and the nature of the contemptuous conduct, the
circumstances under which the contempt was committed, the
effect the misconduct had on the administration of justice,
and the need to vindicate the authority of the court are highly
context-dependent, the Commission has not provided a
specific guideline for this offense. In certain cases, the
offense conduct will be sufficiently analogous to § 2J1.2
(Obstruction of Justice) for that guideline to apply.205
The Sentencing Commission clearly advocates analogizing to a
similar offense when issuing a sentence for criminal contempt. Moreover,
the Commission states:
Many offenses, especially assimilative crimes, are not
listed in the Statutory Index or in any of the lists of Statutory
Provisions that follow each offense guideline. Nonetheless,
the specific guidelines that have been promulgated cover the
type of criminal behavior that most such offenses proscribe.
The court is required to determine if there is a sufficiently
analogous offense guideline, and, if so, to apply the
200. Carpenter, 91 F.3d at 1283 (“Congress has not seen fit to impose limitations on the
sentencing power for contempts . . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting Green v. United States, 356
U.S. 165, 188 (1958))).
201. Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149 (1969) (“[A] person may be found in
contempt of court for a great many different types of offenses . . . . Congress, perhaps in
recognition of the scope of criminal contempt, has authorized courts to impose penalties but has
not placed any specific limits on their discretion . . . .”).
202. Id.
203. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2J1.1 cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018).
204. See generally Carpenter, 91 F.3d at 1285 (comparing criminal contempt to obstruction
of justice and sentenced the defendant as such).
205. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2J1.1 cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2018) (emphasis added).
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guideline that is most analogous. In a case in which there is
no sufficiently analogous guideline, the provisions of 18
U.S.C. § 3553 control.206
Clearly, the Commission intended criminal contempt to be punished
as its most analogous offense would be punished.
Given the clear language of the Sentencing Commission Application
Commentary, the policy behind the lack of a statutory maximum, and
general rationality, the Ninth Circuit approach to classification of
criminal contempt seems most in line with legislative intent. However,
this approach has one extreme shortcoming—it rests on the assumption
that all courts will uniformly analogize criminal contempt. Universal
adoption of this method fails to account for the discretion judges would
have in analogizing contempt to similar offenses. Such an approach
would likely bring a litany of appeals. And what would the standard of
review be for such an appeal? Abuse of discretion? This is a difficult
standard to overcome and would not yield much relief to those convicted
of criminal contempt.
Therefore, while most practical, the Ninth Circuit Analogous Offense
approach fails to provide the uniform of application of law that is the very
foundation of our Constitution, which requires equal treatment and due
process of law such that similar crimes are punished similarly. Something
must change, and none of these approaches are particularly helpful. This
Note proposes the adoption of a statute, such as those in Florida,
California, Texas, and New York, to provide a maximum sentence for
federal criminal contempt. This Note does not advocate for the
suppression of judicial discretion to punish criminal contempt, as our
Founders found this discretion necessary to the administration of law;207
however, this Note suggests that the court should retain its broad
discretion to determine what is and is not criminal contempt, but that the
court’s ability to vary the sentences contemnors receive should be limited
by the creation of a statutory maximum.
This pragmatic approach does not require an additional statute to
define which actions constitute criminal contempt, as some states have.208
This solution merely requires adopting a ceiling for punishment of
criminal contempt—a statutory maximum. With the adoption of a
statutory maximum for criminal contempt, such that a defendant cannot
be sentenced for more than six months’ or one years’ imprisonment and
not subject to more than a $500 or $1,000 fine, similar to the states
mentioned in Part IX, defendants will face much more uniform
punishments, as well as punishments that fit the crime for which they are
206. Id. § 2X5.1 background (emphasis added).
207. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812).
208. FLA. STAT. § 38.23 (2018).
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convicted. A contemnor will no longer be branded a Class A felon as he
would be under current law in the First and Seventh Circuits. Rather, a
contemnor will be subject to uniform punishment under the law as the
Constitution requires. This applies directly to the issue of supervised
release discussed in Part VI, as a clear definition of the statutory
maximum allows for uniform classification of the offense, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3559. All contempts will be classified as the same offense level,
and therefore the appropriate length of supervised release will similarly
be uniform.209
CONCLUSION
In 2014, 316 defendants faced charges for “[p]erjury, contempt, and
intimidation,” only 0.2% of the 160,505 suspects in matters received by
U.S. Attorneys.210 Of the 229 defendants who were sentenced, 162 were
incarcerated.211 While these numbers do not represent a large subset of
the population, it is imperative to the fundamental notions of justice that
all defendants receive sentences of similar character for similar crimes.
Moreover, offenders of the same crime should be classified in the same
way—one should not be sentenced for a misdemeanor and the other for a
felony.
Adoption of a statutory maximum maintains the discretion of courts
to punish offenders for criminal contempt while creating uniformity in
sentencing for criminal contempt; such a statute limits the ability of
judges to impose sentences that can vary drastically. Judges may punish
many offenses—which may differ drastically, from being too loud in
court212 to refusing to testify213—as criminal contempt. However,
criminal contempt boils down to a contemnor causing a court difficulty
in administering justice. All crimes of that nature should be punished
similarly.
The approaches advanced by the First, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits do not present practical solutions to the uncertainty surrounding
how to punish for criminal contempt. The First and Seventh Circuits rely
too heavily on the plain meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 401 without considering
the practicality of punishing criminal contempt as a Class A felony. The
209. 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (2012).
210. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 34, at 9 tbl.2.1.
211. Id. at 22 tbl.5.2.
212. See Cuyler v. Atlantic & N.C.R. Co., 131 F. 95, 98 (C.C.E.D.N.C. 1904) (“Any loud
noise or other disturbance in the presence of the court, or in the street or other place so near thereto
as to interfere with the orderly proceedings of the court, would undoubtedly tend to obstruct the
administration of justice, and under such circumstances the court is empowered to summarily
punish for contempt.”).
213. See Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 383 (1919) (“[O]bstruction to the performance
of judicial duty resulting from an act done in the presence of the court is, then, the characteristic
upon which the power to punish for contempt must rest.”).
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Eleventh Circuit approach is far too unpredictable and lacks precedent.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit fails to address the notion that judges may not
uniformly analogize contempt. Creating a statutory maximum is a
balanced solution which even-handedly applies the law while retaining
the broad discretionary power of judges.
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